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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
June 26, 1986 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 1835
Cert. to Cal. Ct. App.

CALIFORNIA

v.
ROONEY (Bookmaker)
1.

SUMMARY~

State/crim.

Timely

Petr contends. that the Cal •.:;.~.-~j·

excluding certai_n evidence against him that __~~!
pursuant to a warrantless search of a

_e:~e?l~-: ~ ~~:-~ _.- -\;,aV

discc:>~~ : f:.~ ;~-::-··__ .>~"'
.

commun~l.trash

.

.

bin at

"
his

apartment complex.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

On December 3, 1983, an

informant told Officer Shorb, of the L.A. police department, that
resp, Peter Rooney, was conducting a bookmaking operation by
telephone in which he accepted wagers on professional football
games.

The informant gave Shorb resp's telephone number, told

·\{~~ c.- <t..l&_ s QQ...,-""'l

'io l._z_ ""-

<;

e"' ~. -~

~0

- 2 him when resp typically accepted the wagers, but did not specify
the location where all this took place.

Shorb quickly traced the

telephone number to 1120 No. Flores St., Apt. 8, West Hollywood,
however, which local utility records listed as being the home of
"Peter Ryan."

Shorb then checked

~-

p~

arrest record and

learned that he had been arrested three years earlier for
conducting bookmaking operations at the same apartment.
also obtained a mug shot

Shorb

~~~~~--~----~
of~r.

On December 15, 1983, Shorb and another officer went to the
unit apartment complex on Flores St. where

p~lived

and

conducted a search through the large, communal trash bin.
'------------------------------------~
halfway down, they discovered a brown paper bag with mail
addressed to
/

~at

About

the flores St. address, and pieces of paper

with "sports wagers, pays and owes, and a tally sheet of wagers
on professional football teams."
On December 26, 1983, the officers placed petr's apartment

--

under surveillance.

They saw him enter the apartment.

~hey

called the telephone number supplied by the informant and heard
the informant answer.

They then heard the informant ask,

"~fuat's

the latest line," to which an unknown male answered with the
~

latest point spreads.

Based on this information, the
to search

~

~r's

activities.

ap~tment

officers~ined

a warrant

to find evidence of his bookmaking

The record does not contain any details of the

search that the officers then conducted.

~~was

arrested and indicted on charges of bookmaking.

filed a pretrial motion to quash the search warrant and to
r,

He

-

3 -

exclude the evidence obtained from the trash search.

~he

~C

granted the motion in its entirety, reasoning that there was no
probable cause to support either the warrantless trash search or
the subsequent warrant to search the apartment.

~he

prosecution

was unable to proceed, and
so the case was dismissed •
.,

-------

The Cal. Ct. App. reversed the TC to the extent it quashed
the search warrant, holding that the warrant was supported by
probable cause.

But it affirmed the exclusion of the trash

-__..........

search evidence.

It reasoned that under the California

------'--V

Constitution, persons

~ave

a reasonable expectation of privacy in

trash bins because the property placed in
yet abandoned.

t~em

is typically not

Under California case law, the validity of a

trash search is analyzed by the same standard as the validity of
an automobile search:
~.--------

probable cause.

a warrant is not

neede~,

but there must be

The court concluded that here there had been no

probable cause to justify the warrantless trash search.
The court then noted, however, that under Proposition 8, a
binding voters' initiative, the state courts may not exclude
evidence "seized in violation of the California but not the
federal Constitution."

Though recognizing that the circuits have

uniformly held that trash set aside for collection is abandoned
property and therefore outside the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, the court argued that it was not bound to follow
decisions of the lower federal courts, but only the decisions of
the California Supreme court or this Court, which has never
squarely ruled on the issue.
The Cal. S. Ct. denied review.

- 4 (

3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that the lower court's

ruling was based on federal law, and not on an adequate and
independent state ground.

The opinion recognized

t~at

Proposition 8 rendered its exclusionary rule coextensive with
that of the Federal Constitution, and that "various federal
courts have held that trash placed in an area where it can be
collected is abandoned property that is not protected by the
Fourth Amendment."

See, e.g., United States v. Michaels, 726

F.2d 1307 (CAB 1984); United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789 (CA7
1983); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299 (CA2 1983); United
States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397 (CA3 1981); United States v.
Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99 (CA5 1979); United States v. Crowell, 586
F.2d 1020 (CA4 1978); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d lll (CA6 1976);
United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970 (CAl 1972).

~herefore,

the state court erred in upholding the exclusion of the trash
evidence.
4.

DISCUSSION:

In stating that it was bound to follow only

the decisions of this Court, and not those of the federal
circuits, it is not clear whether the Cal. Ct. App. was
interpreting its state law obligation under Proposition 8, or
whether it was making an abstract legal assertion concerning how
it must determine the content of federal constitutional law.
Given the court's obvious desire to base its decision on state
law and thereby insulate itself from the review of this Court,
the former reading seems reasonable.

On the other hand, given

that the court mentioned the California Supreme Court in the same
breath with this Court in identifying the courts that have

- 5 I

I

'

binding authority over it, the latter reading also seems
reasonahle.

The proper resolution of this issue determines

whether the decision below was based on an adequate and
independent state ground, or whether it decided a federal
question in a manner that creates a conflict with virtually every
circuit to address the issue under the Fourth Amendment.
In

~igan

v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), this Court set

forth a test for determining whether a state court decision rests
on an adequate and independent state ground or not:
"[W]hen ••• a state court decision fairl.y appears to
rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with
the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence
of any possible state law ground is not clear from the
face of the opinion, we will accept as the most
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the
case the way it did because it believed that federal
law required it to do so." Id., at 1040-1041.
Although this test seems to create a presumption in favor of
finding the existence of a federal question, the presumption only
arises if the "decision fairly appears to rest primarily on
federal law."

This is such a close call on the facts of this
~

case that this case would probably involve a refining of the
Michigan v. Long test in order for the Court to reach the Fourth
Amendment question.

This being the case, summary reversal is
seems undesirable.

Nevertheless, I recommend CPR.
There is no response.
June 20, 1986

Guynn
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No. 85-1835, California v. Rooney
Cert.

To

Cal.

Ct.

App.

(Lillie,

PJ

[concurring

L-V~

'

in judgment],

Thompson, Johnson, JJ.)
To be argued Tuesday, March 24, 1987 (3rd case)

~

- - - - - - -d

~~

~ .

~~--~
.I'
c.~

Question Presented
Does
making a

the

Fourth

Amendment

warr~ ination

- ·

bin of a multi-unit apartment?

prohibit

V"L-

~ , ~ -~

police

officers

fr~m ~
t.AVCI4 ~

of garbage in the commynal trash

~

~~

2.

I. BACKGROUND

In

December

Shorb,

a

Los

wagers

on

1983

a

Angeles

confidential

police

professional

informant

officer,

football

Officer Shorb determined that

that

games

told

Officer

resp was accepting

over

the

telephone.

the telephone number provided by

the informant was 1 isted to a "Peter Ryan," at 1120 North Flores
Street,

Apartment

8,

West

Hollywood.

The

off ice r

further

determined that resp had been arrested in 1978 for conducting a
bookmaking operation at the same address.
at 1120 North Flores Street is a "2in all.

It comprises
App. 77.

building

and walked

down

the

driveway

garage was

"accessible

to

to the

feet

building.

high,

that

was

shared

underground

public."

garag~tained~out
5

an

Id.,

garage.

The

80-81.

The

at

8 feet long, 4 feet wide, and

by

all

the

residents

of

The officers sorted through a full load of trash.

the
In

the bottom half of the bin they found a shopping bag containing
mail address~ in Apartment 8.
'

.

The bag contained records

'

of sports wagers, "pays and owes," and a tally sheet of wagers on
~

various professional football teams.

The next day Officer Shorb

observed resp, whom he recognized from a police photograph, enter
Apartment 8.

Later,

Officer

Shorb telehponed Apartment 8

and

overheard a telephone conversation between an informant and an
"unknown mal e."

The informant asked,

"What's the latest 1 ine?"

The unknown male responding by giving the latest point spread on
professional football games.

3.

On the basis of this

information~ficer

Shorb obtained a

warrant to search resp' s apartment.

The record does not reveal

what

was

additional

search.

Resp

evidence,
was

if

charged

any,
with

recovered

felonious

during

operation

of

the
.a

A ~ ate magistrate granted resp's motion

bookmaking operation.

to quash the search warrant.

The

~perior

Ct.

granted resp' s

motion to suppress evidence obtained from the trash bin and the
search of

resp' s apartment.

The

L..c:al.

Ct. App.

agreed that the

papers taken from the trash bin were inadmissible, but went on to
hold that the warrant to search resp's apartment was supported by
probable cause even excluding the information obtained from the

The ~l.

trash.

Sup. Ct. denied review.

II. DISCUSSION
1. Does the Cal. Ct.
independent state groun ?
Although
memo

suggests

California

's decision rest on an ade uate and

the briefs do not discuss this issue,
that

the

Constitution.

/

Cal.

Ct.

It

App's

is

true

decision
that

the

the cert.

rests on
ct.

the

discussed

~

California cases at length,

and apparently held that searching

the trash bin violated the State Constitution.
has

abolished

the

exlcusionary

rule for

viol at ion of the State Constitution.
§28 (d),

the

so-called

"Truth

in

But California

c:-

evidence

obtained

in

Under Cal. Const. art.

I,

Evidence"

provision

of

the

Victim's Bill of Rights, as interpreted by the Cal. Sup. Ct., the
California cts will not suppress "'evidence seized in violation
of the California but not the federal, Constitution.'"
20

(quoting In re Lance, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 879 (1985)).

Petn app.
The Cal.

4.

Ct. App.

recognized this, and went on to state:

"While various

federal courts have held trash placed in an area where it can be
collected

is

abandoned

Fourth Amendment,

property

that

is

not

protecte

by

the

those decisions are not binding on this court

since the United States Supreme Court has never squarely ruled on
the issue."

Id., at 20-21.

upon

it

which
'

constit~tional

relied

The ct. concluded that the decisions

"are

provi~ions

•••

based

on

-

both

federal

and

state

that this court must follow until

either the California or the United States Supreme Court rules on
the issue."

Id., at 21-22 {emphasis added).

to discuss Abel v. United States,

362

u.s.

length, and to distinguish it on its facts.

The ct. proceeded
217

{1960~,

at some

It thus seems clear

{to me, at least), that the Cal. Ct. App. would have reached the
opposite result

if

it had concluded

resp's had been violated.
{1983),

the

law,
.-------.

federal

state
or

ct's

to be

that no federal

Under Michigan v. Long, 463
decision appears to rest

"interwoven" with federal

adequacy and independence

right of

u.s.

1032

primarily on
law,

and the

of any possible state ground is not

clear on the face of the opinion.

I therefore conclude that the

Court has jurisdiction.

2.

The Merits.

case for you.

I do not think this is a particularly hard

The Cal. Ct. App.'s decision is contrary to "the

overwhelming weight of authority."

United States v.

0' Bryant,

775 F.2d 1528, 1533 {CAll 1985); United States v. Thornton, 746
F. 2d 3 9 ,

4 9 an d n • 11 {CADC 19 8 4 ) •

In spite of the contorted

arguments in petr's brief {which must be one of the worst merits

.J .,

5.

briefs

the

Court
i

decision

has

received

simply

whether

this

year),

the

the

officers

question
violated

for
a

"constitutional y protected reasonable expectation of privacy" of
resp's.

See California v. Ciraolo, 106 s.ct. 1809, 1811 (1986).

I think they did not.
Resp placed a bag of papers in a large open trash bin in an

----

----

area accessible to the public.

It is true that "what [a person]

seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public,
States,

may

be

constitutionally

389

u.s.

347,

351-352

protected."

(1967).

privacy must be a reasonable one.

But

Katz

v.

United

the expectation of

Here, resp knew that the trash

would be handled by sanitation workers.

If a sanitation worker

had noticed the incriminating evidence and turned it over to the
police,

I do not see how resp could have complained.

Moreover,

it is a fact of life that private citizens often go through trash
containers looking for

aluminum cans or other items of value.

(In New Haven, while I was at law school, it was very common for
"street peo:ele" to go through the dumpsters located in and around
Yale

buildings

sell.

to find clothing,

food,

or

anything they

could

No doubt Hollywood is more affluent than New Haven, but I

have the impressionm this is a common occurrence in the United
States.)

--

In this case,

there was no local ordinance foEbidding

citizens from looking through trash.
an ordinance,

it

Even if there had been such

probably would not have created a

reasonable

expectation that it would be obeyed.)
In my view,

this is enough to dispose of resp's contention

that he enjoyed a general expectation of privacy in his garbage.

6.

Resp's next argument is that,

even if he could not reasonably

expect complete privacy, he at least had a reasonable expectation
that police officers would not examine the trash for the purpose
of discovering evidence of crime.

But the distinction between

police officers and "other persons" is unpersuasive.

First, as a

general

enforcement

pol ice

rule,

should

responsibilities
activities
Ciraolo,

than

not

members

S.Ct.

106

carrying
be
the

of

1813

180 9'

out

their

more

restricted

Second,

off ice r

needs

to

See v

public.

(aerial

( 1986)

offercer trained to recognize marijuana
judicial

provide

1 aw

a

is

basis

in

their

eal ifornia v.

observation

by

"precisely what
for

a

a ~

warrant.")

if the confidential informant had gone through the trash

himself, without being prompted by the police, the evidence would
have been admissible.
this

and

an

I see no significant difference between

examination

by

police

officers.

(Of

course

the

evidence is likely to support a finding of probable cause, and be
more damaging to a defendant at trial, if it is found by a police
officer than by an informant.)
Even r esp concedes that pol ice officers may search a city
--------------------~--dump_t or ~crime.
It would be absurd to require the
police to obtain a warrant before searching public property for,
say, a discarded weapon.

I see no basis for distinguishing trash

at the city dump from trash in a communal trash bin located in an
area accessible to the general public.
on behalf of
Catch-22

As the amicus brief filed

California and other states observes,

quality

expectation of

to

resp's

privacy

argument

in his

that he had a

garbage

until

it

there is a
reasonable

had lost

its

~

7.

identity

being

by

mixed

with

other

garbage.

Resp

seems

to

suggest that,

if the garbage can be traced to him and used as

evidence,

must

it

be

Tha t

suppressed.

is,

th e

pol ice

are

permitted to examine resp's garbage only if it cannot be used as
evidence against him!

On the other hand, a person probably does

have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage kept within
the curtilage of a private home, as several lower cts have held.
E.g., Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 483-484 (CAS 1974).

In

those cases, however, the Fourth Amendment applies because of the
reasonable

expectation

of

privacy

in

all

items

within

the

curtilage, not because of any reasonable expectation of privacy
in garbage.

In this case, resp apparently does not contend that

a communal trash bin in a garage open to the public is within the
curtilage, and it seems clear that it is not.
The Court might rest its decision on the conclusion that
resp "abandoned" his papers by placing them in the trash bin.

He

gave up control over them and, as a practical matter, made them
accessible
United

to anyone who

States,

3 62

u.s.

cared
217

to dig

( 196 0) ,

them out.

the

v-

In Abel

Court held that

v.
the

infamous Soviet spy Colonel Rudolph Abel had abandoned items the

----------

--

FBI seized from a waste;eaper basket in Abel's hotel room after
Abel

checked out.

On balance,

decision on "abandonment."

however,

I would not

rest

The California cts have found that a

person does not give up all his rights in personal property
placing them in the trash.

7

individuals have a

the

by~_

In particular, the cts have held that

right to expect

handled only by garbage collectors.

that their garbage will be
People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d

~

8.

357 (1971).

Of course abandonment for Fourth Amendment purposes

need not depend on state law.
general

ground

that

resp

But by deciding the case on the

had

no

reasonable

expectation

of

privacy, the Court can give minimal weight to California law.
I

also

see

no

reason for

the

Court

to

consider

resp' s

suggestion that the "automobile except ion" of United States v.
Chadwick, 433
that

a

u.s.

1 (1977), should apply to garbage.

warrantless

search

is

justified

upon

It may be

probable

cause

because garbage is likely to be moved or commingled with other
garbage in the time it
situations

are

so

takes to get a warrant.

different

particularly helpful,

that

the

analogy

But
does

the two
not

seem

and it is unnecessary to the decision of

the case.
Finally,

there

is

decision in petr' s favor

nothing

to

resp's

should not

contention

be applied to

that

him.

a

Resp

suggests that he relied on state law for the proposition that he
had

a

right

Constitution,
"Proposition

of

privacy

but

8,"

his

apparently
the

amendment abolishing the
required by federal

in

garbage
disclaims

well-known

any

Cal if or nia

exclusionary

law.

under

Moreover,

rule

the

California

knowledge

of

constitutional

except where it

is

the overwhelming weight of
'

federal authority was against him.

Resp should not be allowed to

rely on such a selective ignorance of the law.
Aside on Petr's Brief.
written

by

senior

attorneys

Attorney for Los Angeles,

Petr' s brief, which apparently was

-

in

the

~

office

of

the

District

(To start with, my copy is

bound with electrician's tape--and all the pages except p. 1 are

~

9.

upside down!)

Petr argues at length that the papers in the trash

bin were not resp's papers in the constitutional sense.
extent this makes any sense at all,

it is just a roundabout way
Petr also makes

of saying that r esp had abandoned the papers.
the mystifying statement
that

in

some

that

intellectually

To the

"[c]andor compels

us to concede

respectable

of

sense

the

term,

'reasonable expectation of privacy' can be so used that indeed a
prudent,

law-abiding

person

may

arguably

be

said

to

have

a

reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to garbage placed
in

a

communal

trash

bin

when

he

intends

and

desires,

-...

and

reasonably anticipates, that police will not examine the contents
of the trash container."
argue

that

"reasonable

Brief for Petr 64-65.
expectation

of

J/

Petr goes on to

privacy"

should

not

be

/

defined as what a

reasonable 1 ayperson would expect--that is,

that ls ome reasonable expectations of privacy are unreasonable in
the eyes of the 1 aw.

This is silly.

Perhaps petr is thinking of

Justice Harlan's remark that the Fourth Amendment protects only
those

expectations

of

privacy

that

society

is

prepared

to

recognize as reasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
As a practical matter, a decision in favor of the State is
unlikely to result in a significant invasion of privacy.
as CA2 has noted,

---

First,

"once the trash is discarded the former owner

rarely has any further interest in it other than to be assured
that it will not remain at his doorstep.
when

he

desires

to

preclude

inspection

In the rare instance
by

others

of

private

papers in his garbage he may do so by first shredding or burning

~

I

10.

them

or

machine."
cert.
well

by

hand-delivering

the

papers

to

a

garbage-grinding

United States v. <e rry, 702 F.2d 299, 309 (CA2 1983),

denied,

461

u.s.

931.

These

elementary

known and widely practiced when a

precautions are

person truly wishes to

keep a paper private. ~ given the difficult and unpleasant
nature of the task, it is unlikely that the police will engage in
extensive searches of garbage.
whatever

plausibility

pol ice would

decide

smelling refuse.

it

has

to wade

Indeed,
from

the

resp' s argument derives
improbability

through mounds

of

that

the

possibly foul-

But the fact that police rarely resort toJ

uch

unpleasant investigative methods does not imply that they will
not resort to them in the rare case in which it is worthwhile to
examine particular garbage to determine whether evidence can be
discovered and linked to a particular suspect.
I

recommend that you vote to reverse the judgment of the

Cal. Ct. App.

~

Supreme Court of the United States
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-----------------------------------,
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1835

CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. PETER ROONEY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[May - , 1987]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The police obtained information that one Pete:r Ryan was
accepting wagers on professional football games at 1120
North Flores Street, Apartment 8, West Hollywood, California. Two officers went to 1120 North Flores, a 28-unit
apartment building with a subterranean garage which was
accessible to the public, entered the garage, and searched the
communal trash bin. In the bottom half of the bin they discovered a brown paper shopping bag which contained mail
addressed to respondent at 1120 North Flores Street, Apartment 8, and papers bearing bookmaking notations. The police seized the bag. They used these items and the results of
further investigation to support a search warrant of respondent's apartment, which was duly executed.
Rooney was charged with bookmaking and associated
crimes. He moved to have the warrant quashed and the evidence obtained from the search of the trash bin excluded.
The trial court granted his motion, the State declared that it
could not proceed, and the case was dismissed. The State's
appeal followed. The California Court of Appeal held that
the State had failed to prove that Rooney had abandoned his
property by putting it into the tras~ bin. Because the garage was accessible to the public, however, and the officers
did not commit a trespass by entering the garage, the court
also rejected Rooney's claim that the search of the bin was
illegal because it occurred within the curtilage of his apart-
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ment. In so ruling, the Court of Appeal relied on a holding
of the California Supreme Court to this effect. People v.
Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 152, 390 P. 2d 381 (1964). The court
went on to hold that under the decisions of the Supreme
Court of California, the Fourth Amendment did not require a
warrant for a trash bin search but did require probable cause,
which the court found lacking here. 1 The search of the trash
bin therefore violated the Fourth Amendment and the evidence seized from the bin was not admissible. The subsequent warrant, however, was itself valid, since it was
supported by probable cause wholly aside from the trash-bin
evidence. It is the former holding that the State challenged
in its petition for certiorari after the California Supreme
Court denied review. We granted the petition, - - U. S.
- - (1986), and for the reasons that follow, we reverse.
We note at the outset that we have no reason to differ with
the state court that the trash bin was not within the curtilage
of Rooney's apartment, that the garage was open to the
public and that the officers committed no trespass and were
not invading any private zone when they approached the
trash bin. The question is whether the search of the trash
bin and the seizure of some of its contents were unreasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, which protects the right of the people to be secure "in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures."
The court observed that the "Truth in Evidence" provision of the Victim's Bill of Rights (Proposition 8) abrogated a defendant's right to object
to and to suppress evidence seized in violation of the California but not of
the Federal Constitution. The Court of Appeal noted, however, that the
California Supreme Court had held that under both the California and Federal Constitutions, a trash can outside the curtilage of a house could be
searched without a warrant, but not without probable cause. People v.
Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P. 2d 1262 (1971), remanded, 409 U. S. 33
(1972), on remand, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457, cert. denied, 412 U. S. 919
(1973).
1
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The State submits that once Rooney placed the seized
items in the trash bin, he abandoned them and lost any possessory or ownership interest in them that he may have had.
Hence, they were no longer his papers or effects and were
not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 2 The Court of
Appeal rejected this submission; and for ~ent pur_p9ses,
we assume that under state law Rooney retained an ownership or posessory 1 eres in tne ras ag an its contents.
Rooney s property in teres , however, does not settle the
matter for Fourth Amendment purposes, for the reach of the
Fourth Amendment is not determined by state property law.
As we have said; the premise that property interests control
the right of officials to search and seize has been discredited.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 183 (1984); Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 353 (1967); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U. S. 294, 304 (1967). The primary object of the Fourth
Amendment is to p~otect priYe,cy, not property, and the
question in this case:-;s the Court of Appeal recognized, is
not whether Rooney had abandoned his interest in the property law sense, but whether he retained a subjective expectation of privacy in his trash bag that society accepts
as objectively reasonable. O'Connor v. Ortega, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1987); California v. Ciraolo, - - U.S. - - ,
- - (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S., at 177; Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). We therefore proceed to that inquiry.
2

The State emphasizes that the Fourth Amendment protects the "right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects."
It points to Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 176-177 (1984), as an
illustration of the plain language approach to the Fourth Amendment. In
Oliver, we based our holding that the Fourth Amendment does not extend
to an open field on the explicit language of the amendment. We held that
an open field is neither a "house" nor an "effect." See also id., at 184
(WHITE, J., concurring).
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We acknowledge at the outset that trash can reveal a great
deal about the life of its disposer. 3 As respondent eloquently phrases it, the domestic garbage can contains numerous "tell-tale items on the road map of life in the previous
week." Brief for Respondent 15. A hope of privacy is not
equivalent to an expectation of privacy, however. Respondent vigorously argues that he exhibited an expectation of privacy by taking the affirmative step of placing his bag of trash
in the bottom half of the dumpster. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38,
43-44, 55-56. This argument is somewhat difficult to accept.
Nothing in the record demonstrates that respondent actually
buried his trash in the bin as opposed to simply throwing it in
when the bin was nearly empty. In any event, assuming
that respondent did have a subjective expectation of privacy,
"steps taken to protect privacy [do not] establish that expectations of privacy . . . are legitimate." Oliver v. United
States, 466 U. S., at 182. "Rather, theCoiTect inquiry
is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment." ld., at 182-183. A person may well intend not
to relinquish all rights in personal property but nevertheless take action rendering this intent ineffective for Fourth
Amendment purposes.
The State points out that the communal trash bin in which
respondent placed his refuse was accessible to other tenants
The Garbage Project of the University of Arizona, directed by archaeologists at the University, was founded upon the advice of archaeology
pioneer Emil Haury: "If you want to know what is really going on in a community, look ~t its garbage." W. Rathje, "Archaeological Ethnography
... Because Sometimes It is Better to Give than to Receive," in R. Gould
(eel.), Explorations in Ethnoarchaeology 49, 54 (1978). In that project,
Tucson Sanitation Division Personnel randomly selected refuse set out for
collection by households throughout the city. Procedures ensured anonymity. The archaeologists sorted the refuse from each household into
more than 150 categories in order to improve their understanding of contemporary society (as well as to refine techniques for understanding the
material culture of earlier societies).
3
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in the apartment building and their guests, to the owner and
manager of the building, and to the public at large. It is
common knowledge that trash bins and cans are commonly
visited by animals, children, and scavengers looking for valuable items, such as recyclable cans and "Bottles, and serviceable clothing and household furnishings. Accordingly, California argues, any expectation of privacy respondent may
have had in the contents of the trash bin was unreasonable.
Respondent argues in response that the probability that
garbage collectors or the police will search the contents of a
particular trash bin is extremely small, and that this minute
probability, in and of itself, makes his expectation of privacy
in the trash bin reasonable. According to respondent, the
reality of domestic garbage collection is that the collectors
move quickly from bin to bin, do not have time to look for
valuable items, and probably would not recognize evidence of
criminal activity. Garbage is promptly intermingled with
other garbage in a truck such that its origin can no longer be
identified. It is then "hauled to the dump, where it will
be burned/destroyed/plowed under by Caterpillar tractors, to
form the foundation for new housing developments." Brief
for Respondent 16. Similarly, respondent asserts that there
clearly are too few policemen in Los Angeles to conduct
random searches of trash cans for evidence of crime. Respondent further argues that one may have a "differential
expectation of privacy" with respect to animals, children,
and scavengers and with respect to the police. I d., at 18;
see Smith v. Alaska, 510 P. 2d 793, 803 (1973) (Rabinowitz,
C. J., dissenting). While it may not be totally unforeseeable
that trash collectors or other third persons may occasionally
rummage through one's trash, it may be quite unexpected
that the police will conduct a systematic inspection for evidence of criminal activity. In any event, respondent s.t ates
that the Fourth Amendment protects against the acts of the
government, not private citizens.

85-1835-0PINION
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We are unpersuaded. "What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States,
389 U. S., at 351-352 (citations omitted). Respondent
knowingly exposed his betting papers to the public by depositing them in a trash bin which was accessible to the public.
Once they were in the bin, he no longer exercised control
over them. While he may not have welcomed intrusions,
respondent did nothing to ensure that his refuse would not be
discovered and appropriated. Indeed, he placed his papers
in the bin for the express purpose of conveying them to third
parties, the trash collectors, whom he had no reasonable
expectation would not cooperate with the police. In Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979), we held that the installation, at the request of the police, of a pen register at the
telephone company's offices to record the telephone numbers
dialed on the petitioner's telephone did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. The petitioner had no legitimate expectation
of privacy in the telephone numbers since he voluntarily conveyed them to the telephone company when he used his telephone. "This Court consistently has held that a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." I d., at 743-744.
Respondent's reliance on the fact that the police do not
ordinarily engage in random searches, or comprehensive citywide searches, of trash cans is misplaced. A police department, like-any organization with limited resources, allocates
its resources to activities most likely to result in the detection
or prevention of crime. The police in this case searched the
trash bin after receiving a tip from an informant that a bookmaking operation was being conducted at the apartment
house. It is not unforeseeable that police will investigate
when they have information suggesting that an investigation
will be useful. In Smith v. Maryland, for example, a Balti-
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more woman was robbed and thereafter received threatening
and obscene phone calls from a man identifying himself as the
robber. When their investigation led the police to suspect
that the petitioner was the perpetrator, they had the pen
register installed and recorded a call from the petitioner's
home to the victim. The petitioner would have been entirely
justified in believing that the police would not likely have discovered his telephone call to the victim by means of a random
search of telephone numbers dialed in the city, and that the
police would not likely have undertaken a systematic search
of all telephone calls made in the city. That fact, however,
did not give petitioner a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the telephone numbers he dialed. In California v. Ciraolo,
- - U. S. - - , - - , n. 2 (1986), we expressly rejected tfie
California Court of Appeal's position that a search, which it
would have found permissible if conducted pursuant to a routine police patrol, violated the Fourth Amendment because
information of illegality had led the police to focus on a particular place. We held in that case that the observation of a
fenced backyard by police officers trained in marijuana identification from a private plane at an altitude of 1,000 feet did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because the defendant
had no legitimate expectation that his property would not be
so observed:
"The observations of Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in
this case took place within public navigable airspace . . .
in a physically nonintrusive manner; from this point they
were able to observe plants readily discernable to the
naked eye as marijuana. That the observation from the
aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the officers were trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant.
Such observation is precisely what a judicial officer
needs to provide a basis for a warrant. Any member of
the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could
have seen everything that these officers observed. On
this record, we readily conclude that respondent's expec-

85-1835-0PINION
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tation that his garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor." !d., at--.
Any distinction between the examination of trash by trash
collectors and scavengers on the one hand and the police on
the other is untenable. If property is exposed to the general
~ic, it is ex osed in e ual measure to the pol~ce.
is
clear from Ciraolo t at the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal
activity that any member of the public could have observed,
even if a casual observer would not likely have realized that
the object indicated criminal activity or would not likely
have notified the police even if he or she had realized the object's significance. It may of course be true that a person
minds an examination by the police more than an examination
by an animal, a child, a neighbor, a scavenger, or a trash collector, but that does not render the intrusion by the police
illegitimate.
The Court of Appeal noted the existence of municipal ordinances which prohibit persons other than authorized collectors from rummaging through the trash of another. Such ordinances, however, do not change the fact that the owner of
the trash completely re1inquishes control over the trash to a
third party, the designated trash collector, who for all the
owner knows, will cooperate with the ·police. Cf. Lewis v.
United States, 385 U. S. 206 (1966); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U. S. 293 (1966). Moreover, it is not at all clear that
such a municipal ordinance would evoke an expectation of privacy in trash. Respondent did not rely on any such ordinance here and it has been noted that the purpose of such
ordinances is sanitation and economic protection of the
authorized trash collector rather than privacy. See United
States v. Vahalik, 606 F. 2d 99, 100-101 (CA5 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U. S. 1081 (1980); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d
357, 368, n. 1, 486 P. 2d 1262 (1971) (Wright, C. J., concurring and dissenting), remanded 409 U. S. 33 (1972), on re-
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mand, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457, Cert. denied, 412 U. S.
919 (1973).
Every federal Court of Appeals that has addressed the
issue as cone u e
a
e ourth Amendment does not
protect trash placed for collection outside a residence and its
curtilage. United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F. 2d 1432,
1437 (CA9 1986); United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F. 2d 1528
(CAll 1985); United States v. Michaels, 726 F. 2d 1307,
1312-1313 (CAS), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 820 (1984); United
States v. Kramer, 711 F. 2d 789 (CA7), cert. denied, 464
U. S. 962 (1983); United States v. Terry, 702 F. 2d 299,
308-309 (CA2), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 931 (1983); United
States v. Reicherter, 647 F. 2d 397, 399 (CA3 1981); United
States v. Vahalik, supra; United States v. Crowell, 586 F. 2d
1020, 1025 (CA4 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 959 (1979);
Magda v. Benson, 536 F. 2d 111, 112-113 (CA6 1976); United
States v. Mustone, 469 F. 2d 970, 972 (CAl 1972). The
Courts of Appeals had little difficulty reaching this conclusion. As the Third Circuit stated in United States v.
R eicherter:
"Defendant claims that . . . he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash he placed in a public area to
be picked up by trash collectors . . . . A mere recitation
of the contention carries with it its own refutation. . . .
Having placed the trash in an area particularly suited
for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having
strangers take it, it is inconceivable that the defendant
intended to retain a privacy interest in the discarded
objects. If he had such an expectation, it was not reasonable." 647 F. 2d, at 399.
This unanimity of opinion among the federal appellate courts
supports our determination that society is not prepared to
accept as reasonable an expectation of privacy in trash deposited in an area accessible to the public pending collection by a
municipal authority or its authorized agent.
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The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed
and this case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1835

CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. PETER ROONEY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[June-, 1987]

PER CURIAM.

We granted the State's petition for certiorari to decide
whether respondent retained an expectation of privacy in a
bag that he placed in the communal trash bin of a multi-unit
apartment building. After briefing and oral argument on
that issue, it has now become clear that the question is not
properly presented in this case.
I

Based upon an informant's tip that respondent was accepting wagers on professional football games at a specified telephone number, police began an investigation which eventually led to an application for a search warrant for 1120 North
Flores Street, Apartment No. 8, West Hollywood, California. In conjunction with the application, a police officer submitted an affidavit including at least five details in support of
the warrant: 1) that the informant had -named Rooney and
had correctly specified when Rooney would be at the apartment; 2) that the telephone number and utilities were listed
to one Peter Ryan, and that use of a pseudonym is common
among bookmakers; 3) that Rooney had previously been arrested for bookmaking at the apartment; 4) that through a
search of the communal trash bin in the apartment building's
basement the police had retrieved a bag containing mail addressed to Rooney at apartment No. 8, and containing evidence of gambling activity; and 5) that the police had dialed
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the telephone number the informant had given them and had
overheard a conversation involving point spreads on professional football games. See App. 19-28. The magistrate
found probable cause for a search of Apartment 8, and issued
a warrant. Incriminating evidence was found during the
search and respondent was arrested.
After he was charged with a number of felony offenses, respondent brought a motion to quash the search warrant and
to dismiss the felony charges against him. He argued that
there was no probable cause to support the warrant because
the earlier warrantless search of the communal trash bin had
violated his Fourth Amendment rights under a number of
California Supreme Court precedents, and that, without the
incriminating evidence found in the trash, there was insufficient evidence to support the warrant. A magistrate
granted respondent's motion, agreeing that the evidence obtained from the trash bin could not be used to support the
search warrant for the apartment, and ruling that the other
evidence offered in support of the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. The Superior Court
reached the same conclusion. Pursuant to California procedural rules, the State then informed the court that it could
not prosecute the case without the evidence seized in the
search of the apartment, and the case was dismissed, thus
allowing the State to appeal the order quashing the warrant.
The Court of Appeal reversed on the only issue before itto use the State's words, "the sufficiency of the affidavit in
support of the search warrant." 1 Although it concluded
'Appellant's Opening Brief in the Ct. App. Cal. 2d App. Dist.,
No. B006936, p. 2.
Throughout the proceedings it was clear that the courts were passing
only upon Rooney's motion to quash the search warrant and suppress the
evidence found in the apartment; there was no motion to suppress the evidence found in the trash. For example, the first thing the magistrate said
after calling Rooney's case was: "This is before the Court on the notice of
motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Penal Code Section
1538.5." Clerk's Transcript 3. After hearing argument involving the dif-
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that the evidence found in the trash bin could not be used to
support the search warrant, the Court of Appeal examined
the other evidence offered in support of the warrant under
the standards set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462. U. S. 213
(1983), and held that there was sufficient other evidence to
establish probable cause in support of the warrant. The Superior Court's order dismissing the case was therefore reversed, allowing the prosecution to proceed. The California
Supreme Court denied both petitioner's and respondent's
petitions for review. The State then sought review in this
Court, arguing that the California courts had erred in stating
that the search of the trash was unconstitutional. We
granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1986).
II
This Court "reviews judgments, not statements in opinions." Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U. S. 292, 297
(1956); see also Chevron , U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council , Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984); Williams v.
Norris, 12 Wheat. 117, 120 (1827). Here, the judgment of
the Court of Appeal was entirely in the State's favor-the
search warrant which was the sole focus of the litigation was
deemed valid. The fact that the Court of Appeal reached its
decision through analysis different than this Court might
have used does not make it appropriate for this Court to rewrite the California court's decision, or for the prevailing
party to request us to review it. That the Court of Appeal
ferent parts of the affidavit supporting the search warrant, the magistrate
announced: "It is going to be the ruling of this Court that although this is a
relatively close matter, but I feel that the notice of motion to quash the
search warrant pursuant to Penal Code Section 1538.5 should be granted."
!d., at 21.
Again, when the case came before the Superior Court, the first thing the
judge stated was: "The matter pending, motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Section 1538.5. At this point, to classify the issue, is directed at
the sufficiency of the search warrant and challenges the affidavit on its
face ." App. 51.
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even addressed the trash bin issue is mere fortuity; it could
as easily have held that since there was sufficient evidence to
support the search even without the trash evidence, it would
not discuss the constitutionality of the trash search. The
Court of Appeal's use of analysis that may have been adverse
to the State's long-term interests does not allow the State to
claim status as a losing party for purposes of this Court's .
review. 2
But, the State argues, ijthe case does come to trial, and if
the State does wish to introduce the evidence, it will be
barred from doing so because the reasoning in the Court of
Appeal's decision will constitute the law of the case. There
are two too many "ifs" in that proposition to make our review
appropriate at this stage. Even if everything the prosecution fears comes to bear, the State will still have the opportunity to appeal such an order,a and this Court will have the
2

The Deputy District Attorney arguing the case before this Court candidly described the State's reasons for seeking certiorari in this case:
"Q. So that everything you found under the search warrant is
admissible.
"Mr. Guminski: That is correct, Your Honor. But the ruling ... is a
ruling that forecloses the use of what was discovered as far as the trash
bag; that would be the rule of the case.
"Q. And you think you're really going to use that at this trial, or you
think that you would really need to?
"A. Well, Your Honor, I think what we really want would be to ...
overrule People v. Krivda, which was here before the Court in 1972, and
which was remanded then because there were independent state grounds.
"I mean, I wish to answer candidly to your question, Justice; there is an
intention to use it, of course.
"But is it is a vehicle of review." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26-27.
3
Assuming that respondent's motion to suppress the trash evidence will
be granted, the prosecution will then have to decide whether it can prosecute without the evidence. If it cannot, then an order of dismissal will be
entered, and the prosecution may immediately appeal. See Cal. Penal
Code Ann. §§ 1238, 1538.5 (West 1982). Even if the prosecution can proceed without the evidence, however, it may still obtain immediate review
through a writ of mandate or prohibition. § 1538.5(o). A writ of mandate
could compel the superior court to admit the evidence and "must be issued
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chance to review it, with the knowledge that we are reviewing a state court judgment on the issue, and that the State
Supreme Court has passed upon or declined review in a case
squarely presenting the issue. As it stands, we have no way
of knowing what the California Supreme Court's position on
the issue of trash searches currently is. 4 It is no answer to
say that the California Supreme Court already had its chance
to review the matter and declined to do so when it denied the
State's petition for review in this case. The denial of review
may well have been based on that court's recognizing, as we
now do, that the prosecution won below, and was therefore
not in a position to appeal. Giving the California Supreme
where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary
course of law." Cal. Civ. Proc. Ann. Code § 1086 (West 1982). A writ of
prohibition deals with jurisdictional defects and would not appear to be relevant here. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1102 (West 1982). See generally B. Witkin, California Criminal Procedure §§ 869, 870 (1985 Supp.,
pt. 2).
'The California rule regarding trash searches is derived from the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.
2d 1262 (1971) (en bane). We granted certiorari to review that decision
but we were unable to determine whether the California Supreme Court
had rested its decision on state or federal grounds. 409 U. S. 33 (1972).
On remand, the court announced that it had rested on both state and federal constitutional grounds, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457 (1973), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 919 (1973), which prevented us from reviewing the case.
In 1985, however, the people of California amended their constitution to
bar the suppression of evidence seized in violation of the California, but not
the Federal, Constitution. Cal. Const., Art. I, § 28(d); see generally In re
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P. 2d 744 (1985). Thus, the Court of Appeal
was forced to rest its discussion of the trash-search issue in this case on the
Federal Constitution.
While we express no view on the merits of the issue, we note that the
arguments that the State now makes rely, in large part, on post-Krivda
developments, including the State constitutional amendment discussed
above, this Court's intervening decisions, and decisions of the Circuit
Courts of Appeals dealing with trash searches. The California Supreme
Court should be afforded the opportunity to consider these factors before
we intervene.

85-183~PER

6

CURIAM

CALIFORNIA v. ROONEY

Court an opportunity to consider the issue in a case that
properly raises it is a compelling reason for us to dismiss this
petition. 5 Under these circumstances, our review of the
trash search issue, which has never been the subject of an actual judgment, would be most premature.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently
granted.

5
Moreover, because of the unusual posture of the case, we cannot know
whether the prosecution will even seek to introduce the trash evidence at
trial. If the evidence found in the apartment pursuant to the valid warrant is strong enough, the prosecution might not even be interested in presenting the more attenuated evidence found in the trash.
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JUSTICE WHITE , dissenting.
The police obtained information that respondent, using a
specified telephone number, was accepting wagers on professional football games. It was learned from the telephone
company that the telephone number was listed to one Peter
Ryan at 1120 North Flores Street, Apartment 8, West Hollywood, California. Two officers went to 1120 North Flores
Street, a 28-unit apartment building with a subterranean
garage which was accessible to the public, entered the garage, and searched the communal trash bin. In the bottom
half of the bin they discovered a brown paper shopping bag
which contained mail addressed to respondent at 1120 North
Flores Street, Apartment 8, and papers bearing bookmaking
notations. The police seized the bag. They used these
items and the results of further investigation to support a
search warrant of respondent's apartment, which was duly
executed.
Rooney was charged with bookmaking and associated
crimes. He moved to have the warrant quashed and the evidence obtained from the search of the trash bin excluded.
The trial court granted his motion, the State declared that it
could not proceed, and the case was dismissed. The State's
appeal followed. The California Court of Appeal held that
the State had failed to prove that Rooney had abandoned his
property by putting it into the trash bin. Because the garage was accessible to the public, however, and the officers

1/,
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did not commit a trespass by entering the garage, the court
also rejected Rooney's claim that the search of the bin was
illegal because it occurred within the curtilage of his apartment. In so ruling, the Court of Appeal relied on a holding
of the California Supreme Court to this effect. People v.
Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 152, 390 P. 2d 381, 391 (1964). The
court went on to hold that under the decisions of the Supreme
Court of California, the Fourth Amendment did not require
a warrant for a trash-bin search but did require probable
cause, which the court found lacking here. 1 The search of
the trash bin therefore violated the Fourth Amendment and
the evidence seized from the bin was not admissible. The
subsequent warrant, however, was itself valid, since it was
supported by probable cause wholly aside from the trash-bin
evidence. It is the former holding that the State challenged
in its petition for certiorari after the California Supreme
Court denied review. I would reverse.
I
We granted certiorari to consider whether the search of
the communal trash bin violated the Fourth Amendment.
The Court now holds that the issue is not properly before us
and dismisses the writ. Because this judgment is plainly infirm, I dissent.
Rooney first moved to quash the search warrant in the
Municipal Court on the ground that the evidence taken ·from
the trash bin had been illegally seized and could not be used
'The court observed that the "Truth in Evidence" provision of the
Victim's Bill of Rights (Proposition 8) abrogated a defendant's right to
object to and to suppress evidence seized in violation of the California but
not of the Federal Constitution. 175 Cal. App. 3d 634, 644, 221 Cal. Rptr.
49, 55 (1985). The Court of Appeal noted, however, that the California
Supreme Court had held that under both the California and Federal Constitutions, a trash can outside the curtilage of a house could be searched
without a warrant, but not without probable cause. People v. Krivda, 5
Cal. 3d 357, 486 P. 2d 1262 (1971), remanded, 409 U. S. 33 (1972), on remand, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457, cert. denied, 412 U. S. 919 (1973).
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to furnish probable cause for the warrant. The magistrate
agreed that the trash-bin search was illegal and that aside
from the items taken from the bin, the search warrant affidavit failed to reveal probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The case was dismissed when the State indicated it
could not proceed.
The State, claiming that the ruling had been erroneous,
moved in the Superior Court to reinstate the charges. The
motion was granted and a trial date was set. Rooney then
filed a motion "to suppress as evidence all tangible or intangible things seized, including but not limited to observations
and conversations." App. 40-41. There were two grounds
for the motion: first, that the State had obtained the address
of the apartment without a warrant and that this alleged violation tainted the fruits of all subsequent investigations; second, that the search of the trash bin was illegal. App. 43-45.
Most of the hearing on the motion centered on the search of
the trash bin, the court concluding that the items seized from
the bin could not be used to furnish probable cause for the
warrant. App. 69-70. The case was again dismissed on the
State's representation that it could not proceed.
The record to this point plainly reveals that the motion to
suppress filed in the Superior Court literally covered the
items seized from the trash bin. Moreover, quashing the
warrant was based on the ruling that the search of the bin
was illegal and that the items seized could not be used to
support the warrant. It makes no sense to characterize this
ruling as anything but a suppression of the items seized: they
could not be used as evidence to support the warrant and obviously could not be used as evidence at trial.
The State appealed, arguing that the ruling on the trash
bin was erroneous and that the warrant was valid. The
Court now suggests that the Court of Appeal had before it
only the admissibility at trial of the evidence seized from the
apartment pursuant to the warrant. But the warrant could
have been sustained either because the trash-bin search was
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legal and the items seized from the bin therefore admissible
or because the other evidence was itself sufficient. The
Court of Appeal expressly said that both issues were before
it:
"The People bring this appeal (Pen. Code, § 1238, subd.
(a)(7)) from the order dismissing the case against defendant who was charged with bookmaking (§ 337a). The
dismissal was entered after the prosecution represented
that it could not proceed due to the granting of defendant's motion to quash a search warrant and suppress evidence (§ 1538.5). The first issue before us is whether the
warrantless search of the defendant's apartment building's trash bin constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure. We conclude that it did for lack of probable
cause. The second issue is whether a police officer's
affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrant authorizing the search of defendant's
apartment. We conclude that even excluding the items
seized from the trash bin, the tip from the informant
coupled with other corroborating evidence were sufficient to support the warrant. We therefore reverse and
remand." 175 Cal. App. 3d 634, 638-639, 221 Cal. Rptr.
49, 51-52 (1985) (emphasis added).
The State argued only the legality of the search of the bin,
and the Court of Appeal addressed that issue first, devoting
most of its opinion to the question, which it surely would not
have done if the issue were irrelevant to its disposition of the
case. Had the Court of Appeal upheld the trash-bin search,
it would have reversed the Superior Court. The Court of
Appeal dealt with the adequacy of the other evidence only
after holding that the items seized from the bin could not be
used as evidence to support the warrant. That ruling effectively made that evidence unavailable to the State.
Both parties filed petitions for rehearing, Rooney arguing
that the issue of the adequacy of the evidence aside from the
items seized from the bin was not properly before the court
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and that the issue had been improperly decided. The State
reargued the legality of the search of the bin but also asked in
any event that the court strike the portion of its opinion dealing with the the items seized from the trash, since that ruling
foreclosed using that evidence at trial. Both petitions were
denied.
Both sides then filed petitions for review in the California
Supreme Court, the State arguing that it had erroneously
been denied the use at trial of the evidence found in the trash
bin. Both petitions for review were denied. The State then
sought a stay of the Court of Appeal's judgment pending certiorari here. Its argument was that it was entitled to the
stay in order to permit it to seek review of the judgment that
the trash bin items were not admissible at trial. The Court
of Appeal granted the stay and we in turn granted certiorari.
There is no jurisdictional obstacle to deciding the issue on
which we granted certiorari. The highest court of the State
in which review could be had decided that question against
the State, clearly holding that the trash-bin evidence must be
suppressed. It then stayed the effect of that ruling. We
granted certiorari, the case was briefed and orally argued,
and Rooney never suggested that the issue of the trash-bin
search is not properly before us. We have repeatedly held
pretrial orders suppressing evidence to be final judgments
within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3). See New York
v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); California v.
Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966), decided with
Miranda v. Arizona; see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U. ~·
287 (1984); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 (1978); Colorado
v. Bannister, 449 U. S. 1 (1980).
The Court now dismisses the case, but I suggest that its
action is based on a careless and inadequate reading of the
record and that it should have more regard for the time and
Because in
effort that will be wasted by its belated order.
my view the legality of the search of the communal trash can
is properly here, I shall address it.
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II

I note at the outset that I have no reason to differ with the
state court that the trash bin was not within the curtilage of
Rooney's apartment, that the garage was open to the public,
and that the officers committed no trespass and were not invading any private zone when they approached the trash bin.
The question is whether the search of the trash bin and the
seizure of some of its contents were unreasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, which protects the
right of the people to be secure "in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures."
The State submits that once Rooney placed the seized
items in the trash bin, he abandoned them and lost any possessory or ownership interest in them that he may have had.
Hence, they were no longer his papers or effects and were
not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 2 The Court of
Appeal rejected this submission and for present purposes, I
assume that under state law Rooney retained an ownership
or possessory .interest in the trash bag and its contents.
Rooney's property interest, however, does not settle the
matter for Fourth Amendment purposes, for the reach of the
Fourth Amendment is not determined by state property law.
As we have said, the premise that property interests control
. the right of officials to search and seize has been discredited.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 183 (1984); Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 353 (1967); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U. S. 294, 304 (1967). The primary object of the Fourth
2

The State emphasizes that the Fourth Amendment protects the "right
of the people to be secure in their persons , houses, papers, and effects."
Brief for Petitioner 2. It points to Oliver v. United States , 466 U. S. 170,
176-177 (1984), as an illustration of the plain language approach to the
Fourth Amendment. In Oliver, we based our holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not extend to an open field on the explicit language of the
amendment. We held that an open field is neither a "house" nor an "effect. " See also id. , at 184 (WHITE , J ., concurring).
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Amendment is to protect privacy, not property, and the
question in this case, as the Court of Appeal recognized, is
not whether Rooney had abandoned his interest in the property law sense, but whether he retained a subjective expectation of privacy in his trash bag that society accepts
as objectively reasonable. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S.
- - , - - (1987); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.--,-(1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S., at 177; Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz v. United States,
389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). I therefore proceed to that inquiry.
I acknowledge at the outset that trash can reveal a great
deal about the life of its disposer. 3 As respondent eloquently phrases it, the domestic garbage can contains numerous "tell-tale items on the road map of life in the previous
week." Brief for Respondent 15. A hope of privacy is not
equivalent to an expectation of privacy, however. Respondent vigorously argues that he exhibited an expectation of privacy by taking the affirmative step of placing his bag of trash
in the bottom half of the dumpster. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38,
43-44, 55-56. This argument is somewhat difficult to accept.
Nothing in the record demonstrates that respondent actually
buried his trash in the bin as opposed to simply throwing it in
when the bin was nearly empty. In any event, assuming
that respondent did have a subjective expectation of privacy,
3

The Garbage Project of the University of Arizona, directed by archaeologists at the University, was founded upon the advice of archaeology
pioneer Emil Haury: "If you want to know what is really going on in a cofnmunity, look at its garbage." W. Rathje, "Archaeological Ethnography
... Because Sometimes It is Better to Give than to Receive," in Explorations in Ethnoarchaeology 49, 54 (R. Gould ed. 1978). In that project,
Tucson Sanitation Division personnel randomly selected refuse set out for
collection by households throughout the city. Procedures ensured anonymity. The archaeologists sorted the refuse from each household into
more than 150 categories in order to improve their understanding of contemporary society (as well as to refine techniques for understanding the
material culture of earlier societies).
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"steps taken to protect privacy [do not] establish that expectations of privacy ... are legitimate." Oliver v. United
States, 466 U. S., at 182. "Rather, the correct inquiry
is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment." !d., at 182-183. A person may well intend not
to relinquish all rights in personal property but nevertheless take action rendering this intent ineffective for Fourth
Amendment purposes.
The State points out that the communal trash bin in which
respondent placed his refuse was accessible to other tenants
in the apartment building and their guests, to the owner and
manager of the building, and to the public at large. It is
common knowledge that trash bins and cans are commonly
visited by animals, children, and scavengers looking for valuable items, such as recyclable cans and bottles, and serviceable clothing and household furnishings. Accordingly, California argues, any expectation of privacy respondent may
have had in the contents of the trash bin was unreasonable.
Respondent argues in response that the probability that
garbage collectors or the police will search the contents of a
particular trash bin is extremely small, and that this minute
probability, in and of itself, makes his expectation of privacy
in the trash bin reasonable. According to respondent, the
reality of domestic garbage collection is that the collectors
move quickly from bin to bin, do not have time to look for
valuable items, and probably would not recognize evidence of
criminal activity. Garbage is promptly intermingled with
other garbage in a truck such that its origin can no longer be
identified. It is then "hauled to the dump, where it will
be burned/destroyed/plowed under by Caterpillar tractors, to
form the foundation for new housing developments." Brief
for Respondent 16. Similarly, respondent asserts that there
clearly are too few policemen in Los Angeles to conduct
random searches of trash cans for evidence of crime. Respondent further argues that one may have a "differential
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expectation of privacy" with respect to animals, children,
and scavengers and with respect to the police. I d., at 18;
see Smith v. Alaska, 510 P. 2d 793, 803 (1973) (Rabinowitz,
C. J., dissenting). While it may not be totally unforeseeable
that trash collectors or other third persons may occasionally
rummage through one's trash, it may be quite unexpected
that the police will conduct a systematic inspection for evidence of criminal activity. In any event, respondent states
that the Fourth Amendment protects against the acts of the
government, not private citizens.
I am unpersuaded. "What a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S., at 351-352 (citations omitted). Respondent knowingly exposed his· betting papers to the public by
depositing them in a trash bin which was accessible to the
public. Once they were in the bin, he no longer exercised
control over them. While he may not have welcomed intrusions, respondent did nothing to ensure that his refuse would
not be discovered and appropriated. Indeed, he placed his
papers in the bin for the express purpose of conveying them
to third parties, the trash collectors, whom he had no reasonable expectation would not cooperate with the police. In
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979), we held that the
installation, at the request of the police, of a pen register
at the telephone company's offices to record the telephone
numbers dialed on the petitioner's telephone did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers since he
voluntarily conveyed them to the telephone company when
he used his telephone. "This Court consistently has held
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." I d., at
743-744.
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Respondent's reliance on the fact that the police do not
ordinarily engage in random searches, or comprehensive citywide searches, of trash cans is misplaced. A police department, like any organization with limited resources, allocates
its resources to activities most likely to result in the detection
or prevention of crime. The police in this case searched the
trash bin after receiving a tip from an informant that a
bookmaking operation was being conducted at the apartment
house. It is not unforeseeable that police will investigate
when they have information suggesting that an investigation
will be useful. In Smith v. Maryland, for example, a Baltimore woman was robbed and thereafter received threatening
and obscene phone calls from a man identifying himself as the
robber. When their investigation led the police to suspect
that the petitioner was the perpetrator, they had the pen
register installed and recorded a call from the petitioner's
home to the victim. The petitioner would have been entirely
justified in believing that the police would not likely have discovered his telephone call to the victim by means of a random
search of telephone numbers dialed in the city, and that the
police would not likely have undertaken a systematic search
of all telephone calls made in the city. That fact, however,
did not give petitioner a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the telephone numbers he dialed. In California v. Ciraolo,
476 U. S., at--, n. 2, we expressly rejected the California
Court of Appeal's position that a search, which it would have
found permissible if conducted pursuant to a routine police
patrol, violated the Fourth Amendment because information
of illegality had led the police to focus on a particular place.
We held in that case that the observation of a fenced backyard by police officers trained in marijuana identification
from a private plane at an altitude of 1,000 feet did not violate
the Fourth Amendment because the defendant had no legitimate expectation that his property would not be so observed:
"The observations of Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in
this case took place within public navigable airspace ...
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in a physically nonintrusive manner; from this point they
were able to observe plants readily discernible to the
naked eye as marijuana. That the observation from the
aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the officers were trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant.
Such observation is precisely what a judicial officer
needs to provide a basis for a warrant. Any member of
the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could
have seen everything that these officers observed. On
this record, we readily conclude that respondent's expectation that his garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor." !d., at--.
Any distinction between the examination of trash by trash
collectors and scavengers on the one hand and the police on
. the other is untenable. If property is exposed to the general
public, it is exposed in equal measure to the police. It is
clear from Ciraolo that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal
activity that any member of the public could have observed,
even if a casual observer would not likely have realized that
the object indicated criminal activity or would not likely
have notified the police even if he or she had realized the object's significance. It may of course be true that a person
minds an examination by the police more than an examination
by an animal, a child, a neighbor, a scavenger, or a trash collector, but that does not render the intrusion by the police
illegitimate.
The Court of Appeal noted the existence of municipal ordinances which prohibit persons other than authorized collectors from rummaging through the trash of another. Such ordinances, however, do not change the fact that the owner of
the trash completely relinquishes control over the trash to a
third party, the designated trash collector, who for all the
owner knows, will cooperate with the police. Cf. Lewis v.
United States, 385 U. S. 206 (1966); Hoffa v. United States,
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385 U. S. 293 (1966). Moreover, it is not at all clear that
such a municipal ordinance would evoke an expectation of privacy in trash. Respondent did not rely on any such ordinance here and it has been noted that the purpose of such
ordinances is sanitation and economic protection of the
authorized trash collector rather than privacy. See United
States v. Vahalik, 606 F. 2d 99, 100-101 (CA5 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U. S. 1081 (1980); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d
357, 368, n. 1, 486 P. 2d 1262, 1264, n. 1 (1971) (Wright,
C. J., concurring and dissenting), remanded 409 U. S. 33
(1972), on remand, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457, cert. denied,
412 u. s. 919 (1973).
Every Federal Court of Appeals that has addressed the
issue has concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not
protect trash placed for collection outside a residence and its
curtilage. United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F. 2d 1432,
1437 (CA9 1986); United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F. 2d 1528
(CAll 1985); United States v. Michaels, 726 F. 2d 1307,
1312-1313 (CA8), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 820 (1984); United
States v. Kramer, 711 F. 2d 789 (CA7), cert. denied, 464
U. S. 962 (1983); United States v. Terry, 702 F. 2d 299,
308-309 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom Williams v. United
States, 461 U. S. 931 (1983); United States v. Reicherter, 647
F. 2d 397, 399 (CA3 1981); United States v. Vahalik, supra;
United States v. Crowell, 586 F. 2d 1020, 1025 (CA4 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U. S. 959 (1979); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.
2d 111, 112-113 (CA6 1976); United States v. Mustone, 469
F. 2d 970, 972 (CA11972). The Courts of Appeals had little
difficulty reaching this conclusion. As the Third CircUit
stated in United States v. Reicherter:
"Defendant claims that . . . he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash he placed in a public area to
be picked up by trash collectors . . . . A mere recitation
of the contention carries with it its own refutation.
Having placed the trash in an area particularly suited
for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, pub-
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lie consumption, for the express purpose of having
strangers take it, it is inconceivable that the defendant
intended to retain a privacy interest in the discarded
objects. If he had such an expectation, it was not reasonable." 647 F. 2d, at 399.
This unanimity of opinion among the federal appellate courts
supports the determination that society is not prepared to
accept as reasonable an expectation of privacy in trash deposited in an area accessible to the public pending collection by a
municipal authority or its authorized agent.
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PER CURIAM.

We granted the State's petition for certiorari to decide
whether respondent retained an expectation of privacy in a
bag that he placed in the communal trash bin of a multi-unit
apartment building. After briefing and oral argument on
that issue, it has now become clear that the question is not
properly presented in this case.
I
Based upon an informant's tip that respondent was accepting wagers on professional football games at a specified telephone number, police began an investigation which eventually led to an application for a search warrant for 1120 North
Flores Street, Apartment No. 8, West Hollywood, California. In conjunction with the application, a police officer submitted an affidavit including at least five details in support of
the warrant: 1) that the informant had named Rooney and
had correctly specified when Rooney would be at the apartment; 2) that the telephone number and utilities were listed
to one Peter Ryan, and that use of a pseudonym is common
among bookmakers; 3) that Rooney had previously been arrested for bookmaking at the apartment; 4) that through a
search of the communal trash bin in the apartment building's
basement the police had retrieved a bag containing mail addressed to Rooney at apartment 8, and containing evidence of
gambling activity; and 5) that the police had dialed the tele-
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phone number the informant had given them and had overheard a conversation involving point spreads on professional
football games. See App. 19-28. The Magistrate found
probable cause for a search of Apartment 8, and issued a warrant. Incriminating evidence was found during the search
and respondent was arrested.
After he was charged with a number of felony offenses, respondent brought a motion to quash the search warrant and
to dismiss the felony charges against him. He argued that
there was no probable cause to support the warrant because
the earlier warrantless search of the communal trash bin had
violated his Fourth Amendment rights under a number of
California Supreme Court precedents, and that, without the
incriminating evidence found in the trash, there was insufficient evidence to support the warrant. A magistrate
granted respondent's motion, agreeing that the evidence obtained from the trash bin could not be used to support the
search warrant for the apartment, and ruling that the other
evidence offered in support of the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. The Superior Court
reached the same conclusion. Pursuant to California procedural rules, the State then informed the court that it could
not prosecute the case without the evidence seized in the
search of the apartment, and the case was dismissed, thus
allowing the State to appeal the order quashing the warrant.
The Court of Appeal reversed on the only issue before itto use the State's words, "the sufficiency of the affidavit in
support of the search warrant." 1 Although it concluded
1
Opening Brief for Appellant in No. B006936, Cal. 2nd App. Dist.
Throughout the proceedings it was clear that the courts were passing
only upon Rooney's motion to quash the search warrant and suppress the
evidence found in the apartment; there was no motion to suppress the evidence found in the trash. For example, the first thing the Magistrate said
after calling Rooney's case was: "This is before the Court on the notice of
motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Penal Code Section
1538.5." Clerk's Transcript 2-3. After hearing argument involving the
different parts of the affidavit supporting the search warrant, the Magis-
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that the evidence found in the trash bin could not be used to
support the search warrant, the Court of Appeal examined
the other evidence offered in support of the warrant under
the standards set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213
(1983), and held that there was sufficient other evidence to
establish probable cause in support of the warrant. The Superior Court's order dismissing the case was therefore reversed, allowing the prosecution to proceed. The California
Supreme Court denied both petitioner's and respondent's
petitions for review. The State then sought review in this
Court, arguing that the California courts had erred in stating
that the search of the trash was unconstitutional. We
granted certiorari. 479 U. S. - - (1986).
II

This Court "reviews judgments, not statements in opinions." Black v. CutteT LaboratoTies, 351 U. S. 292, 297
(1956); see also Ch evTon , U. S . A . Inc . v. Natuml R esow·ces
Defense Council , Inc. , 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984); Williarns v.
Non·is, 12 Wheat. 117, 120 (1827). Here , the judgment of
the Court of Appeal was entirely in the State's favor-the
search warrant which was the sole focus of the litigation was
deemed valid. The fact that the Court of Appeal reached its
decision through analysis different than this Court might
have used does not make it appropriate for this Court to re·write the California court's decision, or for the prevailing
party to request us to review it. That the Court of Appeal
even addressed the trash bin issue is mere fortuity; it could
trate announced: "It is going to be the ruling of this Court that although
this is a relatively close matter, but I feel that the notice of motion to quash
the search warrant pursuant to Penal Code Section 1538.5 should be
granted." ld. , at 21.
Again , when the case came before the Superior Court, the first thing the
judge stated was: "The matter pending, motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Section 1538.5. At this point, to classify the issue, is directed at
the sufficiency of the search warrant and challenges the affidavit on its
face." App. 50.
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as easily have held that since there was sufficient evidence to
support the search even without the trash evidence, it would
not discuss the constitutionality of the trash search. The
Court of Appeal's use of analysis that may have been adverse
to the State's long-term interests does not allow the State to
claim status as a losing party for purposes of this Court's
review. 2

record,~.

A - 'reful and adequate reading of the
post, at 5 (JUSTICE
WHITE's dissenting opinion). reveals that the State itself has neYer believed that the Court of Appeal's judgment incorporated any motion to suppress thE:: evidence found in the trash. For example, as JUSTICE WHITE
notes, the State sought rehearing in the Court of Appeal, but as part of
that petition it stated that the Court of Appeal's "opinion should be appropriately modified to delete its discussion of the issue since its determination
that the search warrant was based upon probable cause was made notwithstanding its conclusion that the Krivda rule applies to communal trash
bins.'' Petition for Rehearing or Modification of Order 4. If the Court of
Appeal had actually issued a judgment on the issue, the State would haYe
sought a modification of the judgment-not a mere modification of the
opinion. That the State does not belieYe that the Court of Appeal issued a
judgment excluding the eYidence from the trash search is further corroborated by the State's own arguments before this Court. In its petition for
certiorari, the State explained:
"At first blush, it might be urged that a petition for certiorari should not
be granted because the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the search of the
apartment building communal trash bin was unreasonable constitutes obite?· dicta. However, the Court of Appeal's determination that the search
of the trash bin was unreasonable cannot be deemed to merely constitute
2

obiter dicta. Unless overturned ou this point, the Court of Appeal's con clusion constitutes the la~r of the case. Hence at the trial, the People
would be precluded from introducing eYidence as to what the police officer:;
had found in the trash bin." Pet. for Cert. 14-15 (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Deputy District Attorney arguing the case before this
Court candidly described the State's reasons for seeking certiorari in this
case:
"Q. So that everything you found under the search warrant is
admissible.
"Mr. Guminski: That is correct, Your Honor. But the ruling ... is a
ruling that forecloses the use of what was discovered as far as the trash
bag; that would be the rule of the case.
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But, the State argues, ijthe case does come to trial, and if
the State does wish to introduce the evidence, it will be
barred from doing so because the reasoning in the Court of
Appeal's decision will constitute the law of the case. There
are two too many "ifs" in that proposition to make our review
appropriate at this stage. Even if everything the prosecution fears comes to bear, the State will still have the opportunity to appeal such an order, 8 and this Court will have the
chance to review it, with the knowledge that we are reviewing a state court judgment on the issue, and that the State
Supreme Court has passed upon or declined review in a case
squarely presenting the issue. As it stands, we have no way
"Q. And you think you're really going to use that at this trial, or you
think that you would really need to?
"A. Well, Your Honor, I think what we really want would be to ...
overrule People v. Kr ivda, which was here before this Court in 1972, and
which was remanded then because there were independent state grounds.
"I mean , I wish to answer candidly to your question, Justice; there is an
intention to use it, of course.
"But it is a vehicle of review ." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26-27.
Of course , as we explain, see infra,-----, the law of the case doctrine provides no justification for our granting review at this stage. See
Barclay v. Florida , 463 U. S. 939, 946 (1983); Hathorn v. Lovor"'l , 457
U. S. 255 , 261-262 (1982); see generally R. Stern, E. Gressman , & S. Shapiro , Supreme Court Practice 132 (6th ed. 1986).
3
Assuming that respondent's motion to suppress the trash evidence will
be granted, the prosecution will then have to decide whether it can prosecute without the evidence. If it cannot. then an order of dismissal will be
entered , and the prosecution may immediately appeal. See Cal. Penal
Code Ann . §§ 1238, 1538.5 (West 1982). Even if the prosecution can proceed without the evidence, however, it may still obtain immediate review
through a writ of mandate or prohibition. § 1538.5(o). A writ of mandate
could compel the superior court to admit the evidence and "must be issued
where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary
course of law." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1086 (West 1982). A writ of
prohibition deals with jurisdictional defects and would not 9.ppear to be
relevant here . See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1102 (West 1982). See
generally B. Witkin, California Criminal Procedure §§ 869, 870 (1985
Supp., pt. 2).
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of knowing what the California Supreme Court's position on
the issue of trash searches currently is. 4 It is no answer to
say that the California Supreme Court already had its chance
to review the matter and declined to do so when it denied the
State's petition for review in this case. The denial of review
may well have been based on that court's recognizing, as we
now do, that the prosecution won below, and was therefore
not in a position to appeal. Giving the California Supreme
Court an opportunity to consider the issue in a case that
properly raises it is a compelling reason for us to dismiss this
petition. 5 Under these circumstances, our review of the
trash-search issue, which has never been the subject of an
actual judgment, would be most premature.
• The California rule regarding trash searches is derived from the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Krivda , 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.
2d 1262 (1971) (en bane). We granted certiorari to review that decision
but we were unable to determine whether the California Supreme Court
had rested its decision on state or federal grounds. 409 U. S. 33 (1972).
On remand , the court announced that it had rested on both state and federal constitutional grounds, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P. 2d 457 (1973), cert. denied , 412 U. S. 919 (1973) , which prevented us from reviev.ing the case.
In 1985, however, the people of California amended their Constitution to
bar the suppression of evidence seized in violation of the California , but not
the Federal, Constitution. Cal. Const. , Art. I , § 28(d); see generally In re
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P. 2d 744 (1985). Thus, the Court of Appeal
was forced to rest its discussion of the trash-search issue in this case on the
Federal Constitution.
While we express no view on the merits of the issue, we note that the
arguments that the State now makes rely, in large part , on post-Kn'vda
developments, including the State constitutional amendment discussed
above , this Court's intervening decisions , and decisions of the Circuit
Courts of Appeals dealing with trash searches. The California Supreme
Court should be afforded the opportunity to consider these factors before
we intervene.
' Moreover, because of the unusual posture of the case, we cannot know
whether the prosecution will even seek to introduce the trash evidence at
trial. If the evidence found in the apartment pursuant to the valid warrant is strong enough, the prosecution might not even be interested in
presenting the more attenuated evidence found in the trash .
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The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently
granted.
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